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AOL Doc 6, 2018.02.23 Vice Ch Glasscock’s First Decision 
 
In re AOL Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63 (Del. Feb. 23, 2018).  
§ 1.1 Document: In re AOL Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63  
§ 1.2 In re AOL Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63 
Court of Chancery of Delaware 
January 17, 2018, Submitted; February 23, 2018, Decided 
C.A. No. 11204-VCG 
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2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63 * | 2018 WL 1037450 
 
IN RE APPRAISAL OF AOL INC. 
 
Notice:  
THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT 




§ 1.3 Core Terms 
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merger, working capital, assumptions, negotiation, growth rate, announced, Deals, stock, merger 
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Compliant, Platforms, Opening, media 
 
 






HOLDINGS: [1]-In appraising the fair value of dissenting stockholders' shares pursuant to Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262, the deal price, although useful as a check in determining fair value, did 
not provide sufficient evidence of fair market value to warrant deference because the merger 
agreement was protected by a no-shop and matching right provisions and because public 
statements expressing commitment to the deal would have dissuaded other potential purchasers; 
[2]-Under a discounted cash flow analysis, the most reliable cash flow projections were those 
made by management in the regular course of business, some potential contracts were 
sufficiently certain on the valuation date but another was not, a higher perpetuity growth rate was 
appropriate to account for two rapidly growing divisions, and an amount reserved as working 












• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN1   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262 requires that, where a petitioner is entitled to a determination of the 
fair value of her stock, the trial judge must consider all relevant factors, and that no presumption 
in favor of transaction price obtains. Where, however, transaction price represents an unhindered, 
informed, and competitive market valuation, the trial judge must give particular and serious 
consideration to transaction price as evidence of fair value. Where information necessary for 
participants in the market to make a bid is widely disseminated, and where the terms of the 
transaction are not structurally prohibitive or unduly limiting to such market participation, the 
trial court in its determination of fair value must take into consideration the transaction price as 
set by the market. In sum, while no presumption in favor of transaction price obtains, a 
transaction that demonstrates an unhindered, informed, and competitive market value is at least 
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first among equals of valuation methodologies in deciding fair value. Where a transaction price 
is used to determine fair value, synergies transferred to the sellers must be deducted, to the extent 
they represent elements of value arising from the merger itself. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN2   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The appraisal remedy was created by statute to allow dissenting stockholders an independent 
judicial determination of the fair value of their shares. Because neither party bears the burden of 
proof, in reality, the burden falls on the judge to determine fair value, using all relevant factors. 
The fair value of those shares is exclusive of any element of value arising from the 
accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, as stated in Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 
§ 262, and calculated based on the operative reality of the company as of the date of the merger. 
The court should view the company as a standalone going concern or an on-going enterprise, 
occupying a particular market position in the light of future prospects. Because the court values 
the corporation itself, a minority discount and any synergies or other value expected from the 
merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself must be disregarded. Accordingly, 
petitioning stockholders are given their proportionate interest of the value of the corporation on 
the date of the merger, plus interest. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN3   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Because each transaction is unique, appraisal is, by design, a flexible process. However, the 
clash of contrary, and often antagonistic, expert opinions with widely divergent views is a 
common feature of the genre. There is no perfect methodology for arriving at fair value for a 
given set of facts. There is no presumption that the deal price reflects fair value if certain 
preconditions are met, such as when the merger is the product of arm's-length negotiation and a 
robust, non-conflicted market check, and where bidders had full information and few, if any, 
barriers to bid for the deal. That said, economic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair 
value is the deal price where it results from an open process, informed by robust public 
information, and easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which many parties with an 
incentive to make a profit had a chance to bid. More like this Headnote 
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Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN4   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
A transaction is compliant with case law applying Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262 where (i) 
information was sufficiently disseminated to potential bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could 
take place, (iii) without undue impediments imposed by the deal structure itself. In other words, 
before the court may consider the deal price as persuasive evidence of statutory fair value, the 
court must find that the deal process developed fair market value. If front-end information 
sharing is truncated or limited, the post-agreement period should be correspondingly robust, so to 
ensure that information is sufficiently disseminated that an informed sale can take place and bids 
can be received without disabling impediments. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN5   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The dependability of a transaction price, for purposes of appraisal under Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 
262, is only as strong as the process by which it was negotiated. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN6   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Under Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262, to determine fair value, a court must value a corporation as a 
going concern according to the corporation's operative reality as of the date of the merger. 
Further, a court must take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might 
enter into the fixing of value, and consider facts which were known or which could be 
ascertained as of the date of merger. The court retains discretion to use different valuation 
methodologies so long as the court justifies that exercise of discretion in a manner supported by 
the record before it. The court must derive the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element 
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arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger. § 262(h). When using a 
discounted cash flow analysis, the case law has recognized that management is, as a general 
proposition, in the best position to know the business and, therefore, prepare projections in the 
ordinary course of business. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN7   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
A discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, although complex in practice, is rooted around a simple 
principle: the value of the company at the time of the merger is simply the sum of its future cash 
flows discounted back to present value. Further, a DCF analysis is only as reliable as the inputs 
relied upon and the assumptions underlying those inputs. However, the use of math should not 
obscure the necessarily more subjective exercise in judgment that a valuation exercise requires. 
Although widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when there is no credible market 
information and no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs—all subject to 
disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight differences 
in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN8   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The most important input necessary for performing a proper discounted cash flow (DCF) 
analysis is a projection of the subject company's cash flows. Without a reliable estimate of cash 
flows, a DCF analysis is simply a guess. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
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HN9   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
A determination of fair value must be based on all relevant factors, including elements of future 
value, where appropriate. Any facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the 
date of the merger and which throw any light on the future prospects of the merged corporation 
must be considered in fixing fair value. A corporation must be valued as a going concern based 
upon the operative reality of the company as of the time of the merger. The court must exclude 
speculative costs or revenues, however. Mere actions in furtherance of a potential transaction, 
without a manifest ability to proceed, should not be valued as part of a company's operative 
reality. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN10   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Any discounted cash flow analysis must include a post-projection period of valuation into 
perpetuity at a steady state. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN11   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The value of working capital that is required to fund a company's ongoing operations is already 
reflected in one sense in the discounted present value of those operations; any balance of cash 
not so required is excess and may be added to the discounted cash flow. More like this 
Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
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HN12   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
A deal price may contain synergies that have been shared with the seller in the deal but that are 
not properly included in fair value. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
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GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor 
Each block of marble, Michelangelo believed (or purported to believe) contained a sculpture; the 
sculptor's job was merely to pitch the overburden to reveal the beauty within. Early jurists 
believed (or purported to believe) something similar about common law; that it existed in perfect 
form, awaiting "finding" by the judge.1  By contrast, even Blackstone would expect that 
statutory law would be an explicit, if blunt, tool of justice; manufactured, rather than revealed. 
Our appraisal statute, Section 262 of the DGCL,2  is an exception. Broth of many cooks and 
opaque of intent, it provides every opportunity for judicial sculpting.3  
The latest pitching of stone from the underlying statutory [*2]  body occurred in our Supreme 
Court's recent decisions in DFC and Dell.4  Those cases, in distilled form, provide that HN1  
the statute requires that, where a petitioner is entitled to a determination of the fair value of her 
stock, the trial judge must consider "all relevant factors,"5  and that no presumption in favor of 
transaction price obtains. Where, however, transaction price represents an unhindered, informed, 
and competitive market valuation, the trial judge must give particular and serious consideration 
to transaction price as evidence of fair value. Where information necessary for participants in the 
market to make a bid is widely disseminated, and where the terms of the transaction are not 
structurally prohibitive or unduly limiting to such market participation, the trial court in its 
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determination of fair value must take into consideration the transaction price as set by the 
market. I will refer to transactions compliant with such conditions by the shorthand "Dell 
Compliant." In sum, while no presumption in favor of transaction price obtains, a transaction that 
demonstrates an unhindered, informed, and competitive market value is at least first among 
equals of valuation methodologies [*3]  in deciding fair value. Where a transaction price is used 
to determine fair value, synergies transferred to the sellers must be deducted, to the extent they 
represent "element[s] of value arising from the . . . merger" itself.6  
This matter is before me seeking a post-trial finding of the fair value of AOL Inc. ("Respondent," 
the "Company," or "AOL") under the appraisal statute. Because the seminal cases referenced 
above issued during the pendency of this matter, I asked the parties to supplement the briefing to 
reference the instruction that DFC and Dell supply. I note that, throughout that helpful briefing, 
both the Respondent and Petitioners continue to advocate for my reliance on financial metrics 
rather than transaction price.7  Applying the Dell criteria of information distribution and barriers 
to entry with respect to market participation in evaluating whether the transaction here is Dell 
Compliant, I find the matter a close question. AOL was widely known to be in play, the 
Company talked to numerous potential purchasers in relation to the sale of part (or all) of AOL, 
the no-shop period running post-agreement was not protected by a prohibitive break-up fee, and 
the actions of the [*4]  AOL unaffiliated directors appear compliant with their fiduciary duties. 
No topping offer emerged. Nonetheless, the merger agreement was protected by a no-shop and 
matching right provisions. Moreover, the statements made by AOL's CEO, who negotiated the 
deal, in my view signaled to potential market participants that the deal was "done," and that they 
need not bother making an offer. 
Market participants at this level are not shrinking violets, nor are they barnacles that are happy 
players during a favorable tide, but shut tight at its ebb. Nonetheless, I find the unusually 
preclusive statements by the CEO, in light of the other attributes of this transaction, such that I 
cannot be assured that a less restrictive environment was unlikely to have resulted in a higher 
price for AOL. Accordingly, I am unable to ascribe fair value solely to market price. 
Having rejected transaction price as the sole determinant of value, I find myself further unable, 
in a principled way, to assign it any weight as a portion of my fair value determination. It is 
difficult, in other words, to ascribe to a non-Dell-Compliant sales price (on non-arbitrary 
grounds) 25%, or 75%, or any particular weight [*5]  in a fair value determination. Therefore, I 
take the parties' suggestion to ascribe full weight to a discounted cash flow analysis. I relegate 
transaction price to a role as a check on that DCF valuation: any such valuation significantly 
departing from even the problematic deal price here should cause me to closely revisit my 
assumptions. 
After consideration of the experts' reports provided by the parties, and after addressing the 
differences between the parties in the proper construction of a DCF valuation, in light of the 
evidence at trial, I find that the fair value of AOL stock at the time of the merger was $48.70 per 







A. The Company 
AOL was a well-known8  global media technology company with a range of digital brands, 
services, and products that it provided to advertisers, consumers, subscribers, and publishers.9  
AOL underwent significant changes in both perception and fortune after its apex in 2002, when it 
had more than twenty-six million subscribers in the United States and $9 billion in revenues.10  
AOL spun off as a public company from parent Time Warner in 2009, with Tim Armstrong 
named as Chairman [*6]  and CEO.11  After the spin-off, AOL shrank, ultimately to five 
million subscribers.12  AOL faced substantial competition by 2014 and found itself in need of 
extensive consumer data to shift its desired focus to the online advertising industry.13  In order 
to compete, AOL purchased a number of "content" and "adtech" companies, such as the 
Huffington Post, TechCrunch, Thing Labs, Inc., Adapt.tv, and Vidible.14  These and other 
purchases allowed AOL to reposition itself as an ad tech company.15  
AOL organized itself into three segments: Membership, Brands, and Platforms.16  The 
Membership Group included the legacy dial-up internet and search services.17  The Brands 
Group included the Huffington Post, TechCrunch, MapQuest, and other content providers.18  
The Platforms Group provided automated online advertising services for advertisers and 
publishers across multiple device and media formats.19  As with other companies of similar 
size, AOL was closely followed by numerous analysts.20  
 
 
B. Initial Discussions and Negotiation 
Similar to other boards of directors, the AOL board of directions (the "AOL Board" or the 
"Board") [*7]  "regularly review[ed] and assess[ed] the Company's business strategies and 
objectives," in order to "enhanc[e] stockholder value."21  The AOL Board frequently 
considered many types of transactions and partnerships with other companies.22  "In addition, 
the Company and its representatives [were] routinely approached by other companies and their 
representatives regarding possible transactions."23  Several of those included inquiries from 
Silver Lake,24  Tomorrow Focus,25  Axel Springer,26  Providence Equity,27  and Hellman & 
Friedman.28  
In June 2014, at the request of Verizon Communications Inc. ("Verizon"), AOL CEO Armstrong 
and Verizon CEO Lowell McAdam "discussed ongoing and emerging trends in their respective 
industries" at a media finance conference.29  In October 2014, Verizon management contacted 
AOL to propose an initial meeting regarding "potential partnership opportunities" and the two 
CEOs met again that November.30  A Verizon subsidiary and AOL entered into a 
confidentiality agreement in late November.31  
In early December, representatives of AOL and Verizon met over three days to discuss "several 
potential collaborative opportunities," although McAdam informed Armstrong that "Verizon had 
no [*8]  interest in the acquisition of the entire Company or of a majority interest in the 
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Company."32  In addition, AOL held a preliminary discussion with Comcast, a global 
telecommunications conglomerate, "regarding a potential transaction involving all or part of 
AOL's businesses" on December 9, 2014.33  McAdam and Armstrong spoke again by phone in 
mid-December 2014 and met in mid-January 2015 to "explore a joint venture."34  
AOL management discussed a potential Verizon transaction with the AOL Board during their 
January 2015 meeting.35  In January 2015, rumors about a potential transaction involving AOL 
leaked and caused AOL's stock price to rise.36  
In February 2015, Verizon presented AOL with a high-level term sheet for a potential joint 
venture and the parties met several times to discuss it that February and March and continue with 
due diligence.37  Verizon was not the only suitor for a deal with AOL. An AOL executive 
emailed Armstrong on February 20, 2015 that: 
Given the [Verizon] news in the press, the [AT&T] President of Advertising has express [sic] a 
very strong interest in having broader strategic conversation with us. They want a bite at the 
apple and don't want to be boxed out by [Verizon]. [*9]  If we are going to move forward here 
we should engage at the CEO level is my view.38  
Armstrong responded: 
I know . . . the [AT&T] CEO well - but we should discuss this . . . . We need to be ethical (not 
suggesting you were suggesting that — and know this is natural with press and BD - but me 
calling CEO of AT&T feels like a bridge too far).39  
Armstrong described his rationale for this answer during trial: 
Q. And why did you say that calling the CEO of AT&T in these circumstances was a bridge too 
far? 
A. Well, I think that from where we were at the time period and knowing what we knew about 
AT&T and knowing what we knew about Verizon, the risk of having Verizon walk away at this 
point was much higher than the upside of trying to get AT&T involved when they were clearly 
outsourcing their core business in our core area to us, overall. So it just did not seem like a smart 
move. 
Q. Why were you concerned that a contact with AT&T might cause Verizon to walk away? 
A. I think one is Verizon was upset about the leak. And I think in the situation in a deal 
negotiation where, you know, we're in negotiations with Verizon, AT&T is not a real candidate, 
and we go to them, [Verizon CEO and Chairman McAdam], [*10]  I think, is a very ethical 
person and somebody that, you know, he would take this the wrong way and we would risk 
losing the deal.40  
Armstrong explained during his deposition that the AT&T overture was not "somebody senior at 
AT&T speaking for AT&T. This [was] somebody at the division that [AT&T was] looking to 
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outsource to us, talking to one of our lower-level [business development] people."41  In a later 
explanation to Verizon executive Marni Walden about these discussions with AT&T, Armstrong 
described these as "advanced discussions to launch a new strategic partnership. At the core of the 
discussions was AT&T's content and service portal, which has been powered for Yahoo for 
many years."42  
Fox, a multinational mass media corporation, also contacted AOL to express interest in AOL's 
platforms and brands businesses on February 26, 2015.43  Private equity firm General Atlantic 
contacted AOL in March 2015 "to discuss an acquisition of certain of the Company's assets" and 
entered into a confidentiality agreement on March 7, 2015.44  General Atlantic conducted 
limited preliminary diligence on these assets.45  Fox entered into a confidentiality agreement 
with AOL and listened to a presentation by [*11]  AOL on March 9, 2015.46  
 
 
C. Sales Process 
On March 25, 2015, Verizon proposed obtaining majority ownership of AOL for the first time.47
 The AOL Board began to meet weekly to "review the deal landscape, including the potential 
transaction with Verizon."48  
AOL declined to conduct an auction. Fredric Reynolds, AOL's lead director, explained why 
AOL did not pursue an auction during his deposition: 
Q: Could you please explain why, in your view or in the view of the board as a whole, you 
thought it was not desirable for AOL to run an auction? 
A: Again, I think, if I wasn't clear, I think in a business that has to do with technology and 
content, that it's a very fragile business, and letting the world know that you're for sale impacts 
your relationship with your -- with your competitors for sure, but also with your partners, be they 
publishers, being the search companies, being the talent that you want to attract. 
Those are all very difficult relationships that I think are almost impossible to be managed if 
amedia company or a technology company is for sale. 
I -- I don't recall any large technology or large media company ever putting itself up for sale. I 
think, as evidenced last week, AT&T [*12]  buys Time Warner. There was not an auction of that. 
It's just a very, very -- it's unusual, but technology and media companies don't have hard assets, 
they don't have long-term contracts that make airplanes or iPhones or anything like that. It's all 
ephemeral.49  
Reynolds stated that "the company was not for sale and it was purposeful that it not be for 
sale"50  and that the Board did "not auction[] the company. We had had no intention of 
auctioning the company."51  
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Discussions between AOL and Verizon continued in early April, and McAdam "raised the 
possibility of a 100% acquisition of the Company with Mr. Armstrong" on April 8, 2015.52  
Comcast entered into a confidentiality agreement with AOL that day, but declined to proceed 
any further with a transaction.53  
On April 12, 2015, AOL management discussed the Verizon transaction with the Board, 
including "the emphasis that [Verizon] . . . put on their ability to retain the Company's 
management."54  The Board "requested that Mr. Armstrong keep the Board apprised of these 
discussions as they progressed" but authorized further discussions with Verizon regarding both 
the transaction and management retention.55  AOL opened a data room to Verizon on 
April [*13]  13, 2015.56  
Verizon's counsel engaged AOL's counsel in a discussion on April 14, 2015 about "the 
importance to Verizon of retaining the Company's CEO and others on its management team and 
Verizon's desire to engage in a discussion with Mr. Armstrong regarding such future 
employment arrangements."57  AOL's counsel informed Verizon that "Verizon's views had 
been discussed with the Board and that the Board had authorized Mr. Armstrong to engage in 
such discussions."58  McAdam and Armstrong met again on April 17, 2015 to "discuss the 
potential integration of AOL and its personnel into Verizon's business."59  During this period, 
Fox made several diligence calls to AOL, but did not contact AOL for further information.60  
Verizon sent a draft merger agreement to AOL on April 22, 2015.61  The AOL Board met on 
April 26, 2015 to discuss the draft agreement, the deal landscape, "the possibility of seeking 
alternative offers," Verizon's "emphasi[s] . . . [on] the retention of the Company's management 
team," and AOL's continued retention of Allen & Company ("Allen & Co.") as its financial 
advisor.62  AOL returned a revised draft merger agreement to Verizon on April 27, 2015 that 
proposed changes to a [*14]  number of terms, including termination rights, the non-solicitation 
provision, antitrust approval, and others.63  Verizon management spoke with Armstrong on 
April 30, 2015 about "the importance to Verizon that AOL's talent continue at the Company 
following the Merger and indicated that employment arrangements would be structured by 
Verizon to include compensation opportunities tied to the performance of the Company and in 
aggregate amounts at least comparable to current compensation opportunities."64  However, 
"[n]o specific details of such compensation arrangements were discussed."65  
AOL and Verizon exchanged draft agreements on May 1 and May 3, 2015.66  The AOL Board 
discussed these drafts and "the importance that Verizon was placing on the retention of the 
Company's management team and Verizon's desire for employment and retention arrangements" 
on May 3, 2015.67  
On May 4, 2015, a consortium including, among others, General Atlantic, Axel Spring SE, and 
Huffington Post CEO and founder Arianna Huffington, submitted a letter to AOL indicating its 
willingness to purchase a 51% stake in AOL's Huffington Post asset for approximately $500 
million.68  
On a May 7, 2015 phone call, Verizon informed [*15]  AOL that Verizon "was planning to 
submit a formal offer to acquire the entire Company."69  The AOL representative indicated that 
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AOL expected a price per share "in the 50s" but the Verizon representative indicated that it 
would be "in the high 40s."70  Verizon also indicated that it would present Armstrong with a 
specific employment proposal.71  AOL reported financial results that beat analysts' expectations 
on May 8, 2015.72  
On May 8, 2015, a Verizon representative made an oral offer of $47.00 per share for AOL.73  
An AOL representative countered and Verizon agreed to pay $50.00 per share in cash.74  
Verizon stated that "there was no further room for negotiation with respect to the offer price and 
that if this price was not of interest, Verizon was prepared to withdraw its offer."75  Verizon 
submitted a written offer at $50 later that day. The AOL Board discussed the offer, and counsel 
from the two companies negotiated certain terms.76  
Armstrong phoned a Verizon representative on May 9, 2015 to request a higher price but was 
told "that there was no further room for negotiation with respect to the offer price," although 
Verizon agreed to lower the termination fee from 4.5% to 3.5%.77  The [*16]  AOL Board 
discussed the developments that same day.78  
The parties exchanged additional draft agreements and Verizon delivered a draft employment 
letter offer to Armstrong on May 10, 2015.79  "Mr. Armstrong had no conversations with 
Verizon regarding the draft letter prior to the conclusion of the Company's next Board 
meeting."80  
On May 11, 2015, the AOL Board discussed the Verizon merger agreement with management 
and its legal and financial advisors.81  The Board then "unanimously voted to approve the 
Merger Agreement."82  Later that day, "Verizon informed Mr. Armstrong that they were 
unwilling to proceed with a transaction without his agreement to terms" of employment and 
Armstrong and Verizon came to an agreement.83  
The Verizon board of directors also approved the merger agreement, which was executed on 
May 11, 2015 (the "Merger Agreement" or "Agreement").84  The deal was announced on May 
12, 2015.85  According to Armstrong, "a couple of days after [the] Verizon acquisition was 
announced, AT&T terminated contract negotiations and asked us to stop all development on 
product and content based on general sensitivities to competitor concerns, data separation, 
etc."86  
In a CNBC television interview [*17]  on the day the merger was announced, Armstrong gave 
this account of how the Verizon deal came together: 
Interviewer: Hey, Tim, couple of quick things. Help us with this first. Was there an auction? 
Give us back story here. Meaning, who went to whom? How did this happen? 
Armstrong: You know, basically, this happened in a very natural way and no auction. Basically 
over the course of time I sat down last summer at the Sun Valley conference and we talked about 
where the world was going and we have been big partners and we were kind of reviewing what 
the companies were doing together. That sort of kicked off sort of a natural progression to where 
we are today and I think facilitated by Nancy of Allen and Company and David Shapiro we were 
14 
 
able to basically bring this deal together in a way that I think was incredibly natural. If you look 
at the two visions on the companies and the platforms and both companies were doing the same 
thing. 
Interviewer: It's trading slightly above the premium right now. you didn't shop this to anybody 
else? 
Armstrong: No, I'm committed to doing the deal with Verizon and I think that as we chose each 
other because that's the path we're on. I gave the team at Verizon [*18]  my word that, you know, 
[w]e're in a place where this deal is going to happen and we're excited about it. 
. . . 
Interviewer: Not to push you on it, but why not pursue an auction? 
Armstrong: You know, Andrew, I think the process of where we are as a company right now and 
the process we went through and knew you guys covered, lots of rumors about AOL in general. 
So, if somebody, we have always been a public company and been available. If somebody 
wanted to come do a deal with us, they would have done it. The Verizon deal was built around 
the strategy of where we're going.87  
 
 
D. Merger and Subsequent Events 
The Merger Agreement contained a no-shop provision, a 3.5% termination fee of $150 million, 
and unlimited three-day matching rights.88  Stockholders were informed that the Merger 
Agreement allowed for the "ability to accept a superior proposal."89  Verizon was "[p]repared 
for market action but expect[ed] limited interest from media/technology strategics and financial 
sponsors" due to its assessment of a "limited interloper risk given [the] current sale status with 
[a] lack of full company buyers."90  No topping bidder emerged.91  More than 60% of AOL's 
outstanding common shares were tendered and the merger [*19]  closed on June 23, 2015 (the 
"Valuation Date").92  
The Petitioners filed for appraisal rights under Section 262 of the DGCL.93  Six appraisal 
petitions were filed, which are consolidated in this action.94  The parties and experts agree that 
a DCF analysis is the most appropriate valuation method in this matter.95  My analysis follows. 
 
 
II. WAS THE SALES PROCESS DELL COMPLIANT? 
HN2  The appraisal remedy was created by statute to allow dissenting stockholders an 
"independent judicial determination of the fair value of their shares."96  Because neither party 
bears the burden of proof, "in reality, the 'burden' falls on the judge to determine fair value, using 
'all relevant factors.'"97  The fair value of those shares is "exclusive of any element of value 
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arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation,"98  and 
calculated based on the "operative reality of the company"99  as of "the date of the merger."100
 The court should view the company as a standalone "going concern"101  or an "on-going 
enterprise, occupying a particular market position in the light of future prospects."102  Because 
the court values the "corporation itself," a minority discount103  and "any synergies or other 
value expected from the merger giving rise to the appraisal [*20]  proceeding itself must be 
disregarded."104  Accordingly, petitioning stockholders are given their "proportionate interest" 
of the value of the corporation on the date of the merger, plus interest.105  
HN3  Because each transaction is unique, "[a]ppraisal is, by design, a flexible process."106  
However, "the clash of contrary, and often antagonistic, expert opinions" with "widely divergent 
views" is a common feature of the genre.107  As further described below, there is "no perfect 
methodology for arriving at fair value for a given set of facts."108  
The Supreme Court has "reject[ed] requests for the adoption of a presumption that the deal price 
reflects fair value if certain preconditions are met, such as when the merger is the product of 
arm's-length negotiation and a robust, non-conflicted market check, and where bidders had full 
information and few, if any, barriers to bid for the deal."109  Indeed, the Supreme Court doubts 
its ability "to craft, on a general basis, the precise pre-conditions that would be necessary to 
invoke a presumption of that kind.110  That said, the Supreme Court in DFC stated: 
Although there is no presumption in favor of the deal price, under the conditions found [in DFC] 
by the Court [*21]  of Chancery, economic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value 
was the deal price, as it resulted from an open process, informed by robust public information, 
and easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which many parties with an incentive to 
make a profit had a chance to bid.111  
 
 
A. The Sales Process Was Not "Dell Compliant" 
The question before me is whether the sales process here is Dell Compliant. HN4  A transaction 
is Dell Compliant where (i) information was sufficiently disseminated to potential bidders, so 
that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii) without undue impediments imposed by the deal 
structure itself. In other words, before I may consider the deal price as persuasive evidence of 
statutory fair value, I must find that the deal process developed fair market value. I conclude that, 
under the unique circumstances of this case, the sales process was insufficient to this task, and 
the deal price is not the best evidence of fair value. 
The AOL Board made a deliberate decision that stockholder value would not be maximized 
through an auction, and instead decided to pursue potential bidders individually by direct contact 
through bankers and other sources. [*22]  Given the dynamics of AOL's particular industry, this 
decision appears reasonable. However, if front-end information sharing is truncated or limited, 
the post-agreement period should be correspondingly robust, so to ensure that information is 




Despite statements by AOL's leadership that AOL was not for sale, the persistent market rumors 
seem to indicate that the market understood that the Company was likely in play. AOL was well-
covered by analysts, traded frequently, and generally known in the market. AOL approached, 
and was approached by, a number of potential buyers of some (or all) of the Company, several of 
whom entered into confidentiality agreements and conducted due diligence. 
AOL appears to have engaged with anyone that indicated a serious interest in doing a deal.112  
On the front end, the market canvas appears sufficient so long as interested parties could submit 
bids on the back end without disabling impediments. 
However, here my concern arises. Immediately after announcement of the transaction, 
Armstrong gave a public interview and stated: 
I'm committed to doing [*23]  the deal with Verizon and I think that as we chose each other 
because that's the path we're on. I gave the team at Verizon my word that, you know, [w]e're in a 
place where this deal is going to happen and we're excited about it.113  
Armstrong's post-Agreement statements to the press about giving his "word" to Verizon could 
reasonably cause potential bidders to pause when combined with the deal protections here. In 
Dell, by comparison, the merger agreement included one-time matching rights until the 
stockholder vote; a forty-five day go-shop period; and termination fees of approximately 1% of 
the equity value during the go-shop or approximately 2% afterward.114  Here, a termination fee 
of 3.5% and a forty-two day window between agreement and closing would probably not deter 
bids by themselves. But that period was constrained by a no-shop provision, combined with: (i) 
the declared intent of the acting CEO to consummate a deal with Verizon, (ii) the CEO's prospect 
of post-merger employment with Verizon, (iii) unlimited three-day matching rights, and (iv) the 
fact that Verizon already had ninety days between expressing interest in acquiring the entire 
company and signing the Merger Agreement, including [*24]  seventy-one days of data room 
access. Cumulatively, these factors make for a considerable risk of informational and structural 
disadvantages dissuading any prospective bidder. 
In Dell, after the "bankers canvassed the interest of sixty-seven parties, including twenty possible 
strategic acquirers during the go-shop," the "more likely explanation for the lack of a higher bid 
[was] that the deal market was already robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of 
overpayment," which "suggest[ed] the price [was] already at a level that [was] fair."115  Here, 
given Armstrong's statements and situation, together with significantly less canvassing and 
stronger post-agreement protections than in Dell, I am less confident that is true. I cannot say 
that, under these conditions, deal price is the "best evidence of fair value . . . as it resulted from 
an open process, informed by robust public information, and easy access to deeper, non-public 
information, in which many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance to bid."116  
 
 
B. Deal Price as a Check 
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HN5  "The dependability of a transaction price is only as strong as the process by which it was 
negotiated."117  I find the deal price is not sufficient [*25]  evidence of fair value to warrant 
deference, but it is still useful to an extent. I will use it as a "check" in my determination of fair 
value, although I decline to give the deal price explicit weight in that determination. Given the 
process here, a determination of fair value via financial metrics that results in a valuation grossly 
deviant from deal price, under these circumstances, should give me reason to revisit my 
assumptions. In this way, the deal price operates as a check in my determination of fair value.118
 
The parties have not suggested a principled way to use deal price under the circumstances here, 
in a blended valuation of deal price and other valuation metrics, and none occurs to me. Instead, 
the parties agree, and I concur, that a discounted cash flow analysis is the best way to value the 
Company.119  I turn to that now. 
 
 
III. FAIR VALUE AND DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS 
 
A. Use of Discounted Cash Flow Analysis 
HN6  Under 8 Del. C. § 262, to determine "fair value," a court must value a corporation as a 
"going concern" according to the corporation's "operative reality" as of the date of the 
merger.120  Further, a court "must take into consideration all factors and elements which 
reasonably might [*26]  enter into the fixing of value," and consider "facts which were known or 
which could be ascertained as of the date of merger."121  The court retains discretion to use 
"different valuation methodologies" so long as the court justifies that exercise of discretion "in a 
manner supported by the record before it."122  The court must derive the fair value of the shares 
"exclusive of any element arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger."123  
When using a DCF analysis, "this Court has recognized that management is, as a general 
proposition, in the best position to know the business and, therefore, prepare projections" in the 
"ordinary course of business."124  With these general principles in mind, I turn to my valuation 
of AOL. 
I rely primarily upon a DCF analysis, as "[b]oth experts agree that the DCF is the best and most 
reliable way to value AOL as a going concern as of the merger date."125  HN7  A DCF 
analysis, "although complex in practice, is rooted around a simple principle: the value of the 
company at the time of the merger is simply the sum of its future cash flows discounted back to 
present value."126  Further, a DCF analysis "is only as reliable as the inputs relied upon and the 
assumptions [*27]  underlying those inputs."127  However, "the use of math should not obscure 
the necessarily more subjective exercise in judgment that a valuation exercise requires."128  I 
also acknowledge the Dell court's recent delineation of the weaknesses of the method: 
Although widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when there is no credible market 
information and no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs—all subject to 
disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight differences 
in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps.129  
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The Petitioners hired a well-qualified academic, Dr. Bradford Cornell, a visiting professor at the 
California Institute of Technology, as their expert witness. Cornell performed a financial 
analysis, and concluded that the fair value of AOL stock was $68.98 per share.130  For reasons 
not necessary to detail, however, the Respondent questioned Dr. Cornell's impartiality in this 
matter, and the Petitioners seem content to use the DCF model presented by the Respondent's 
expert as a starting point for my analysis. Accordingly, I start with the DCF valuation provided 
by that expert, Professor Daniel Fischel, and consider the Petitioners' [*28]  limited arguments 
that certain assumption or inputs in that valuation must be changed. 
Fischel opined that the fair value of AOL stock was $44.85 per share.131  The Petitioners' 
disagreements with the Fischel analysis are limited, although the effects of that disagreement on 
the calculation of fair value are vast. The parties dispute only four items: (1) the proper cash flow 
projections for the DCF; (2) the operative reality assumed in the DCF with regard to two deals 
with Microsoft and one deal with Millennial Media Inc.; (3) the proper projection period and 
terminal growth rate; and (4) how much of AOL's cash balance must be added back after the 
DCF. I discuss each in turn. 
 
 
B. Disputed Addition and Inputs 
 
1. Cash Flow Projections 
HN8  "The most important input necessary for performing a proper DCF is a projection of the 
subject company's cash flows. Without a reliable estimate of cash flows, a DCF analysis is 
simply a guess."132  The parties point to three potential sets of cash flow projections. The 
projections relied on by Fischel in his analysis, which I use as a starting point, are management's 
long-term plan for 2015 (the "Management Projections" or the "LTP").133  Fischel selected 
these projections [*29]  because they were "described as the 'best currently available estimates 
and judgements of [AOL]'s management as to the future operating and financial performance of 
[AOL],' and were used by AOL's financial advisor Allen in its May 11, 2015 fairness 
opinion."134  The Petitioners encourage me to use either of two other projections relied on by 
Cornell. The first is based on ten-year projections that AOL submitted to Deloitte for a tax 
impairment analysis (the "Deloitte Projections").135  The second, (the "Disputed Projections"), 
contained substantial differences, compared to the Management Projections, in working capital 
requirements and was sent by AOL to Verizon's advisors in April 2015. I find that the best 
estimate of cash flow projections is the Management Projections, made in the regular course of 
business, for the reasons that follow. 
The Management Projections were completed in mid-February 2015 and presented to the AOL 
Board.136  The AOL Board created four-year long-term plans as a part of its annual internal 
budgeting process.137  AOL executives testified that the LTP did not include costs or risks from 
specific acquisitions or transactions;138  however, the LTP assumed that AOL would fill 
strategic [*30]  gaps in areas such as mobile supply, shifting demographics, and consumer 
data.139  AOL financial advisor Allen & Co. sent the Management Projections to Verizon, 
albeit without AOL management's sign off.140  
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The Deloitte Projections were created after AOL hired Deloitte to perform a goodwill 
impairment valuation of the Company using a set of ten-year projections developed by AOL for 
this purpose.141  AOL CFO Dykstra testified that she did not create the Deloitte Projections for 
non-tax purposes.142  These projections were created through inputs provided by AOL Senior 
Vice President of Financial Planning and Analysis Michael Nolan,143  after which "[Deloitte] . 
. . r[a]n it through their standard model."144  According to Cornell, a DCF analysis based on the 
Deloitte Projections—instead of the Management Projections—values AOL stock at $55.36 per 
share.145  
The Disputed Projections were created when Allen & Co. expressed concern, in April 2015, that 
AOL's projected working capital "appear[ed] to be materially different from research 
estimates"146  AOL prepared and sent another version of the working capital projections—the 
Disputed Projections—with different assumptions to Verizon's advisors.147  AOL CFO of 
Platforms [*31]  Nick Bellomo stated that he "reviewed the numbers that were shared [with 
Verizon] to "mak[e] them more optimistic" in order to "decrease[] the change in working capital, 
which would have had an increase in cash flow for the business, which would ultimately increase 
the valuation of the business under certain valuation methodologies."148  Bellomo stated that it 
was his "understanding that the valuation that was initially floated to AOL for the purchase of 
AOL may [have] be[en] taken down unless these numbers were improved."149  Allen & Co. 
director Isani explained to AOL Senior Vice President Mark Roszkowski on February 8, 2015 
that: 
I think we should be presenting a robust opportunity case to [Verizon]—and as is typical for 
these processes, it will vary from budget. For internal purposes and record keeping, we should 
have the bridge btw that case and the board budget as well as document the rationale for the gap. 
However, for the dialogue with [Verizon], we present only the robust case and completely own it 
as "the" plan. Typically we would not show board minutes as this is not a corporate deal (this 
case is tricky as the asset represents a large portion of total value). They will ask is 
this [*32]  budget and we will have to rehearse the answer. But for a process like this it is not 
typical for the financials to be revised upward from the conservative board/budget ones 
(Should probably also connect w/ legal to get their input into the caveats for documenting the 
gap).150  
AOL management sometimes referred to the Disputed Projections as "aspirational" in their 
internal correspondence.151  There is also contemporaneous correspondence and trial testimony 
that the Disputed Projections were created with the assumption that AOL would become part of 
Verizon.152  
I note that other evidence challenges this narrative. The Disputed Projections were created after a 
rigorous internal process that involved input from a variety of departments within AOL.153  
Certain of AOL's employees signed off on the projections while they were unaware of a potential 
or likely sale to Verizon.154  The Disputed Projections were submitted to Verizon and 
explained to AOL's Board, apparently as though they were current projections.155  There are 
emails between AOL employees that refer to the LRP as being "incorrect" and outdated.156  
20 
 
The Petitioners contend that AOL's goal for more leverage to decrease [*33]  day sales 
outstanding (thus decreasing the required working capital and thereby improving cash flow) 
could have occurred outside of an anticipated deal with Verizon, although an exact method is left 
unspecified.157  
I find that the Management Projections are in fact management's best estimate as of the 
Valuation Date. While a close call, the record indicates that the Disputed Projections were most 
likely created as a marketing tool in AOL's attempted sale of itself to Verizon. My purpose here 
is to determine the fair value of AOL, and not AOL's value as-advertised. I am not persuaded 
that the Disputed Projections represent the most recent and valid projections used by AOL 
management prior to the Valuation Date. 
Finally, I find that the goodwill impairment projections are not pertinent to my DCF analysis 
here. The purpose behind any set of projections matters because it determines the 
appropriateness of various assumptions that must be made. The Deloitte Projections were made 
for the goodwill impairment analysis—a tax-driven assessment with a host of required 
assumptions that should not, in these circumstances, be used for a DCF analysis. While certain 
assumptions may be appropriate for a [*34]  tax analysis, those same assumptions may be 




2. Pending Transactions as of the Merger 
I start with the following assumptions. HN9  "The determination of fair value must be based on 
all relevant factors, including . . . elements of future value, where appropriate."158  "[A]ny . . . 
facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of the merger and which 
throw any light on [the] future prospects of the merged corporation" must be considered in fixing 
fair value.159  A corporation "must be valued as a going concern based upon the 'operative 
reality' of the company as of the time of the merger."160  I must exclude speculative costs or 
revenues, however.161  Mere "actions in furtherance" of a potential transaction, without a 
manifest ability to proceed, should not be valued as part of a company's operative reality.162  
The Petitioners argue that three potential deals were part of AOL's operative reality, and that any 
fair value analysis of AOL must include these transactions.163  These include: (i) AOL's 
acquisition of Millennial, a programmatic mobile advertising platform;164  (ii) a deal 
for [*35]  Microsoft's Bing search engine to replace Google in powering search results on AOL 
properties (the "Search Deal"),165  and (iii) a ten-year commercial partnership for AOL to run 
the sales of display, mobile, and video ads on Microsoft properties in the United States and eight 
international markets (the "Display Deal") (the Display Deal and Search Deal are together 
referred to as the "Microsoft Deals").166  Fischel did not ascribe value to these transactions in 
his DCF analysis.167  For each of these transactions I ask: (i) if the transaction was part of the 
"operative reality" of the Company as of the Valuation Date, and (ii) if so, was the transaction 
appropriately valued in the LTP. I will adjust my Fischel-based DCF analysis to include the 
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financial impact of those transactions that were part of the Company's operative reality on the 
Valuation Date but which were not included in the LTP. 
 
 
a. Operative Reality 
 
i. Description of the Deals 
As mentioned, the Display Deal allowed AOL to run the sale of display, mobile, and video ads 
on Microsoft properties such as Xbox, Skype, Outlook, MSN, and others in the United States and 
eight other markets.168  After months of negotiation,169  Microsoft and AOL 
traded [*36]  draft term sheets at least through May 2015.170  Armstrong testified that the 
Display Deal "could have blown up at any time" because of, among other things, uncertainty 
surrounding the customers and the Microsoft employees AOL would need to on board.171  
Armstrong confirmed in a May 14, 2015 email that AOL expected to close the Display Deal on 
May 27, 2015.172  Nevertheless, AOL pushed back the Microsoft announcement until after the 
Verizon announcement.173  AOL signed an agreement for the Display Deal with Microsoft on 
June 28, 2015 and announced the transaction on June 30, 2015.174  The Petitioners imply that 
the Display Deal contributes $2.57 per share if included under Fischel's DCF Model.175  
The Search Deal replaced a soon-to-expire contract with Google to allow Microsoft's Bing 
search engine to power advertising and results on AOL's properties.176  Similar to the Display 
Deal, AOL planned to close the Search Deal on May 27, 2015 but delayed until after the Verizon 
announcement.177  An AOL presentation from June 10, 2015 included the key terms, financial 
projections, and other business implications of the Search Deal.178  The Search Deal closed on 
June 26, 2015.179  Microsoft and AOL announced the Microsoft Deals on [*37]  June 30, 
2015.180  The Petitioners do not quantify the impact of the Search Deal but instead urge me to 
"select a DCF value slightly above the median to account for the value added by the Microsoft 
Search Deal, which was accretive to free cash flow beginning in 2016."181  
The path of Millennial Media, Inc. ("Millennial") to an acquisition by AOL (the "Millennial 
Deal") was more circuitous than the Microsoft Deals. After conducting initial diligence, AOL 
passed on buying Millennial in late 2014 but resumed preliminary diligence in February 
2015.182  AOL paused its diligence in April 2015 until Millennial announced its quarterly 
earnings.183  In May 2015, Armstrong told the AOL Board that Millennial might "secure 
another offer in the near term, but we are willing to take that risk."184  Armstrong made a non-
binding offer to Millennial for $2.10 per share on June 5, 2015, "conditioned on exclusivity," and 
stated that "AOL was prepared to move expeditiously to negotiate and sign a definitive 
agreement to effect the transaction."185  AOL sent a "written, non-binding proposal . . . 
reflecting the terms of the June 5 Proposal, and which also included an exclusivity period to 
negotiate a transaction between the parties [*38]  until July 17, 2015."186  On June 10, 2015, 
Millennial opened a data room to AOL and its advisors.187  On June 15, 2015, Millennial and 
AOL signed an agreement to negotiate exclusively until July 17, 2015, and "which contained a 
standstill provision that would terminate if the Company entered into a definitive agreement with 
a third party to effect a business combination."188  Representatives of AOL and Millennial met 
22 
 
on June 17-19, 2015 to discuss Millennial's "financials, business operations, product and 
technology, real estate and security infrastructure."189  On June 23, 2015, Verizon closed the 
merger with AOL.190  
On June 30, 2015, AOL's counsel "circulated a first draft of the Merger Agreement," followed by 
two weeks of meetings, discussions, and negotiations.191  The parties discussed: 
[T]he scope of the representations and warranties, the benefits to be offered to the Company's 
employees following the transaction, the conduct of the Company's business between signing 
and closing of the transaction, the parties' respective conditions to closing, AOL's obligation to 
indemnify and maintain insurance for the Company's directors and officers, the rights of the 
parties to terminate the transaction, [*39]  and the amount and conditions of payment by the 
Company of the termination fee and expense reimbursement described above.192  
The SEC sent Millennial a letter "notifying [Millennial] that the SEC was conducting an 
information investigation" for fraud starting in July 2015.193  After the expiration of the 
exclusivity agreement, Millennial attempted to auction itself to six other buyers, but AOL was 
the only party to submit a proposal.194  AOL, by then under Verizon, agreed to pay $1.75 per 
share to acquire Millennial on September 2, 2015.195  AOL signed the Millennial Deal on 
September 3, 2015.196  The Millennial Deal closed on October 23, 2015.197  The Petitioners 





I find that the Display Deal was part of the operative reality of AOL as of the Valuation Date. I 
am persuaded by the level of certainty in that transaction, given AOL's internal correspondence 
and the concrete plans for an announcement date. I also find that the Search Deal was part of the 
operative reality of AOL as of the Valuation Date. I am persuaded by the apparent certainty of 
the transaction, based on internal correspondence [*40]  and presentations, that this transaction 
was one that both sides fully expected to occur. However, I find that the Millennial Deal was not 
part of AOL's operative reality as of the Valuation Date. AOL had taken a number of steps 
toward a transaction, such as sending a non-binding offer subject to an exclusivity period, 
beginning the due diligence process, and meeting with executives. However, no merger 
agreement drafts had been exchanged and weeks of negotiations, a robust due diligence process, 
and an entire auction yet remained. The actions taken by AOL before the Valuation Date showed 
substantial interest in a transaction but are not, to my mind, sufficiently certain as to be part of 
the operative reality of AOL on the Valuation Date. 
 
 
b. LTP Assumptions 
The second question is whether the operative reality of AOL as of the Valuation Date, including 
the relevant transactions mentioned above, was properly included in the LTP. Because I find that 
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the Millennial Deal was not part of the operative reality of AOL on the Valuation Date, I need 
not answer the second question for that particular transaction. In essence, the question before me 
is this: what is the scope of the assumptions made [*41]  in the LTP? The Petitioners urge me to 
view them narrowly—these specific deals were not assumed—making the Microsoft Deals 
additive to the Management Projections. The Respondent, by contrast, urges me to view them 
broadly—the LTP assumes that strategic gaps will be filled and these transactions merely fill that 
role—so that the LTP remains as management's best prediction of future cash flows and the 
Microsoft Deals should not be additive. My attempt to differentiate the new ingredients from 
those already baked in is below. 
 
 
i. The Display Deal 
The Display Deal and its relation to the LTP were specifically discussed internally after the 
AOL-Verizon merger. AOL executive Roszkowski explained to Verizon executive Walden in a 
September 3, 2015 email that the Microsoft and Millennial Deals were "accretive to [the LTP], 
but should not be a straight addition to revenue and margin" and that "the [] LTP assumed deals 
like MSFT and that [AOL] would close [its] mobile technology/talent gap."199  Roszkowski 
later testified that AOL's LTP was "optimistic . . . and . . . included assumptions that [AOL] 
[would] solve[] for key strategic capability gaps" so that the Microsoft Deals "actually made the 
long-term [*42]  plan more certain" and could not be a "straight . . . addition" to the LTP.200  
The Display Deal included a number of risks, including adding approximately 1,270 Microsoft 
employees in nine countries.201  The parties also dispute smaller, non-dispositive issues.202  
The parties give me two choices with regard to the Display Deal: add the full value of the 
Display Deal as urged by the Petitioners, implicitly worth $2.57, or decline to add it to the LTP, 
as the Respondent recommends. I find that the Display Deal was, at least, partially accretive. I 
am convinced that AOL internally viewed it as at least partially additive to its LTP as evidenced 
by its internal presentations and communications, but I also suspect that it should not be entirely 
additive. Because I lack the information necessary to cut a finer slice in this instance, I add the 
full $2.57 per share to my DCF analysis. In other words, the record gives me no basis that 
another value for the display deal is less arbitrary than $2.57 per share. 
 
 
ii. The Search Deal 
Neither Fischel nor Cornell included the Search Deal in their DCF analyses,203  purportedly 
because "AOL did not produce detailed forecasts for the Search [*43]  Deal."204  The LTP 
initially assumed that a new search deal with Google would be less favorable to AOL than the 
previous deal.205  Armstrong testified that the Search Deal, together with the Display Deal, was 
"meant as a mitigation to the search money that we would lose when we switched from Google 
at the end of that year to Microsoft. But it was unlikely that the Microsoft deal would make up 
for the search loss that we were going to experience overall."206  However, a June 10, 2015 
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AOL presentation included financial projections that explicitly portrayed the Search Deal as 
additive to AOL's OIBDA in comparison with the LTP.207  
I find that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Search Deal is, at least minimally, 
additive to the LTP. The record is lacking in a principled way to account for the Search Deal, 
however. The Petitioners do no more than urge me to "select a number slightly higher than the 
mid-point share price to account for the Search Deal's benefits."208  I find fair value, therefore, 
is best expressed by omitting any speculation as to the value to AOL of the pending Search Deal. 
In other words, the record gives me no basis to find that another value for the Search Deal is less 
arbitrary [*44]  than $0. I also note that I have included the full value of the Display Deal as 
accretive to value, potentially overstating fair value, and I find it prudent not to exaggerate that 
effect by adding speculative value here. 
 
 
3. Projection Period 
HN10  Any DCF analysis must include a post-projection period of valuation into perpetuity at a 
steady state. This case is a now-classic appraisal story of "the tale of two companies." AOL was 
divided into three segments: two parts small and rapidly growing; one senescent. The question 
before me is, in the context of four-year projections, ending with two segments enjoying high 
growth rates and a quiescent third segment, what is the best way to view the terminal period? 
Fischel selected 3.25% as the perpetuity growth rate for AOL.209  Fischel noted that the 
"perpetuity growth rates reported by analysts and advisors ranged from 1.0% to 6.6%, with a 
median of 2.5% and an average of 2.9%."210  Fischel then averaged the 2.9% perpetuity growth 
rate given by analysts and advisors with the 4.6% long-term GDP growth estimate and 2.3% 
long-term inflation rate, resulting in an average rate of 3.28%.211  Fischel reduced the 
perpetuity growth rate to 3.25% due to his concern that [*45]  "AOL's Membership segment was 
the largest contributor to AOIBDA and was declining, so this may overstate the expected growth 
rate for the firm."212  However, Fischel noted that because "AOL Projections do not provide 
estimates beyond 2018 . . . there is some possibility that AOL could experience growth in the 
short term at a rate higher than inflation due to higher growth in the Platforms and Brands 
segments or even potential acquisitions."213  Lastly, Fischel tested the "sensitivity of the 
implied value of AOL's common shares to the perpetuity growth rate by using a range of 3.0% to 
3.5%."214  
Unsurprisingly, the Petitioners characterize Fischel's perpetuity growth rate of 3.25% as "flawed" 
because, they say, combined with his use of a two-stage model, Fischel insufficiently accounts 
for AOL's high growth rate prior to reaching steady state.215  The Petitioners argue that a three-
stage DCF is more appropriate here because "academic literature [such as that by Professor 
Damodaran] counsels that if the growth in the final forecast year is well above the terminal 
growth rate, then a three-stage model is preferred."216  The Petitioners point to Fischel's 
agreement, that two of the AOL businesses were experiencing [*46]  "hypergrowth"217  at the 
end of the two-stage projection period used by Fischel, as evidence that a two-stage model is 




As an alternative, the Petitioners advocate using the ten-year Deloitte projections used for the tax 
impairment analysis to account for the post-Management Projections growth gap described 
above.220  I have already rejected this approach, for reasons set out above; I also note that AOL 
management did not believe it could reliably forecast beyond four years.221  
In a fast-paced industry with significant fluctuations, where management is hesitant to project 
beyond four years, using a three-stage DCF model or a ten-year projection period seems 
particularly brazen. I find that a two-stage model is appropriate under these circumstances. 
However, I agree with the Petitioners that Fischel's two-stage model and perpetuity growth rate 
of 3.25% do not accurately capture the trajectories of the two divisions of AOL that were in 
hypergrowth at the end of the Management Projection period, despite the presence of the 
aforementioned senescent "You've Got Mail" laggard. I find a perpetuity growth rate of 3.5% 
more accurately [*47]  captures AOL's prospects after the Management Projection period ends. 
When a 3.5% perpetuity growth rate is applied to Fischel's DCF model, the fair value of AOL 
stock increases by $1.28 per share.222  
 
 
4. Cash Balance 
HN11  The value of working capital that is required "to fund [a company's] ongoing operations 
. . . is already reflected in one sense in the discounted present value of those operations."; any 
balance of cash not so required is "'excess' and may be added to the discounted cash flow."223  
Fischel and Cornell agree that any such balance should be added back to the valuation for AOL 
after the DCF analysis. Fischel cites to Professor Aswath Damodaran for the financial valuation 
rule that "only cash in excess of the minimum cash balance needed for operations should be 
included in a DCF."224  
The cash on hand of the Company on the Valuation Date was $554 million.225  Fischel adds 
$404 million at the end of the DCF but reserves $150 million as working capital, an asset 
necessary to develop the return on investment that is represented in the DCF.226  Cornell adds 
back AOL's entire cash balance of $554 million. [*48] 227  The Petitioners contend that the 
$150 million "minimum balance" is "litigation driven"228  by pointing to (i) Verizon's and 
AOL's advisors purportedly opposite position in their valuations229  and (ii) AOL's historic dips 
below $150 million cash on hand in 2014.230  They contend that none of this cash should be 
excluded and that no working cash exclusion is appropriate. 
I am not persuaded that, in evaluating the fair value of AOL under these circumstances, I should 
add back all of the cash of AOL, implicitly assuming that zero working capital would be required 
to achieve the returns that the DCF analysis projects. While I recognize that AOL dropped below 
$150 million in cash in the recent past, which the Petitioners point to as evidence that the 
minimum cash balance is a litigation façade, I also acknowledge that historical dips in cash 
reserves pertain to a different time period with different capital requirements. The preponderance 
of the evidence indicates that this not a litigation-driven argument.231  I instead find that the 
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In arriving at fair value, for the reasons [*49]  discussed above, I give full weight to my DCF 
valuation. I begin with Fischel's DCF valuation of $44.85 and add $1.28 per share232  for the 
adjustment to a 3.5% perpetuity growth rate and $2.57 per share to include the Display Deal as 
part of AOL's operative reality. My DCF analysis therefore results in a fair value of $48.70 per 
share. While the deal process was not Dell Compliant and thus not entitled to deference as a 
reliable indicator of fair value, it was sufficiently robust that I use the deal price as a "check" on 
my analysis, while granting it zero explicit weight. I note that value derived from my DCF does 
not deviate grossly from the deal price of $50. 
I am cognizant, however, that I am saying two seemingly incongruent things; namely, that AOL's 
deal process was insufficient to warrant deal price deference at $50 per share—because, due to 
deal deficiencies, the sales price may not capture the full fair value of the Company—while also 
holding, based on my DCF analysis, that the value of AOL stock is even lower, at $48.70 per 
share. One explanation for this incongruity is that HN12  a deal price may contain synergies 
that have been shared with the seller in the deal but that [*50]  are not properly included in fair 
value. 
For the reasons described above, I hold that the fair value of AOL stock was $48.70 per share on 
the Valuation Date. The Petitioners are entitled to the fair value of their shares together with 
interest at the statutory rate. The parties should confer and provide a form of order consistent 
with this Memorandum Opinion. 
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• 167  
See JX2346 (LTP) at Tab I. A.2 Key assumptions (displaying unawareness of Search 
Deal in statement that "[n]ew search deal terms set in for 2016. This will negatively 
impact revenue and bottom line for Core"). 
• 168  
JX2441. 
• 169  
JX2009 at 1 (quoting AOL executive that the MSFT deal "was 9 months of long drawn 
out internal and external negotiation"). 
• 170  
JX2412 (citing May 7, 2015 email from Bain to AOL: "Deal terms are still in flux; we 
anticipate having final terms on Friday 5/8, with some work still to be done on PMP 
terms."); JX2413 (quoting May 8, 2015 internal AOL email with "the latest term sheet" 
with updates about "[AOL's] latest reconciliation on terms with [Microsoft]"). 
• 171  
Trial Tr. 510:4-8, 12-13 (Armstrong). 
• 172  
JX1816 at 1 (email from Armstrong to AOL executives on May 14, 2015). 
• 173  
JX2425 (quoting email from AOL executive Roszkowski to another AOL employee on 
June 2, 2015 to hold off on announcing the Display Deal until after the Verizon 
announcement). 
• 174  
JX2008 at 38-39 (Display); JX1997. 
• 175  
Pet'rs' Answering Br. 46-47 (stating that the Millennial and Display Deals contribute 
$6.71 per share and that the Millennial Deal accounts for $4.14 per share of that 
contribution). I note that Cornell examines the Millennial and Display Deals as 
combined. Pet'rs' Post-Trial Answering Br., Ex. A. 
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• 176  
JX2008; Trial Tr. 512:12-20 (Armstrong); JX2146. 
• 177  
JX1816 at 1 (email from Armstrong to AOL executives on May 14, 2015); JX2425 
(quoting email from AOL executive Roszkowski to another AOL employee on June 2, 
2015 to hold off on announcing the Display Deal until after the Verizon announcement). 
• 178  
JX2433. 
• 179  
JX2146 at 1-2 (including a copy of the Search Deal agreement); JX1997 (including an 
internal AOL email circulating the signature pages). The parties dispute whether the 
Search Deal closed on June 26 or 28, 2015; the distinction is not material to my decision 
here. 
• 180  
JX2008; JX2146. 
• 181  
Pet'rs' Answering Br. 47. 
• 182  
JX0663 at 1; JX2112 at 14. 
• 183  
JX1476 at 1. 
• 184  
JX1595 at 2. 
• 185  
JX2112 (Millennial Schedule 14D-9) at 17. 
• 186  
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Id. at 18. 
• 187  
Id. 
• 188  
Id. at 19. 
• 189  
Id. 
• 190  
Stipulated Joint Pre-Trial Order P 9. 
• 191  
Id. 
• 192  
Id. P 20. 
• 193  
JX2112 (Millennial Schedule 14D-9) at 19-20. 
• 194  
Id. at 20-24, 26 ("AOL was the only party to submit a proposal to acquire Millennial"); 
• 195  
Id. at 23; JX2988. 
• 196  
JX2112 at 25. 
• 197  
JX2130 at 2. 
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• 198  
Pet'rs' Answering Br. 47. 
• 199  
JX2100 at 1 (emphases added); see also Trial Tr. 578:15-579:17, 582:7-18 (Doherty) ("Q. 
And in your view, Mr. Doherty, could you simply add the projections relating to the new 
Microsoft deal on top of the prior management projections? A. No. Not at all. I mean, 
two reasons. Number one, I felt it was already pretty much baked into their plan; and, 
number two, we didn't have a set of projections."). 
• 200  
Id. at 901:3-14 (AOL head of corporate development Roszkowski); see also id. at 343:1-7 
(Verizon EVP Walden); Id. at 314:1-19 (Verizon SVP Doherty). 
• 201  
Tr. 374:15-375:12 (Bellomo); Tr. 512:2-513:8 (Armstrong); JX1993 at 6, 13-15 (quoting 
a June 25, 2015 internal Verizon slide deck explaining the deal and its risks and benefits 
to AOL and Verizon, including employee integration schedules); JX2008 at 9-16, 22-23 
("Advertising Sales and Services Agreement" between AOL and Microsoft dated June 
30, 2015). 
• 202  
The parties dispute the meaning of "delivered value" in an exhibit (JX2436) as either 
"revenue that is delivered to AOL and Microsoft on account of the deal" (Resp't's 
Answering Br. 57) or "by definition . . . additive" (Pet'rs' Opening Br. 59). The parties 
also dispute a slide (JX2441 at 8) that was either "apparently put together by a Bain 
consultant and never shared outside a small group of AOL's management, showing how 
AOL might be able to perform as part of Verizon, with illustrative numbers added on to 
AOL's long-term plan" (Resp't's Answering Br. 57) or as evidence that AOL viewed the 
Display and Millennial Deals as directly additive to the LTP (Pet'rs' Opening Br. 59-60). 
• 203  
Trial Tr. 232:18-19 (Cornell); JX2255 P 41 n.90 (Fischel Report). 
• 204  
Pet'rs' Opening Br. 56. 
• 205  
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JX2346 at Tab I. A.2 Key assumptions [for AOL's LTP] ("New search deal terms set in 
for 2016. This will negatively impact revenue and bottom line for Core."). 
• 206  
Trial Tr. 512:12-20 (Armstrong). 
• 207  
JX1906_VZ-0056420 at 5-6 (comparing difference in Search Deal projections to "AOL 
May 2015 Outlook + 2016-18 Long Term Plan"). 
• 208  
Pet'rs' Opening Br. 56. 
• 209  
JX2255 P 54 (Fischel Report). 
• 210  
Id. P 52. 
• 211  
Id. P 54. 
• 212  
Id. P 54 n.104. 
• 213  
Id. P 53. 
• 214  
Id. P 54 n.104. 
• 215  
Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 64. 
• 216  
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Id. at 65. 
• 217  
Trial Tr. 1105:20-1106:2 (Fischel) ("Q. Okay. Now, two of the AOL business segments 
experienced hypergrowth at the end of the projection period that you used. Correct? A. 
That's right. Q. And AOL did not reach a steady state at the end of the projection period. 
Correct? A. I think that's fair."). 
• 218  
Pet'rs' Post-Trial Answering Br. 50. 
• 219  
Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 66. 
• 220  
Id. at 66-67; JX2277 (Cornell Report) ¶¶ 89-92. 
• 221  
Resp't's Opening Post-Trial Br. 74; Trial Tr. 642:11-23 (Dykstra) ("Q. Why did you only 
project out four years as part of the long-term planning process? A. It was very difficult 
to go beyond four years. You know, we were in businesses and markets where the world 
was changing pretty quickly. I mean, digital marketing really was just coming into play, 
so it was moving fast. We -- it's difficult to predict advertising trends to begin with."); 
JX2233 at 112:22-113:5 (Eoin Ryan Dep., former AOL head of investor relations and 
now AOL head of financial planning); Trial Tr. 642:11-23 (Dykstra); JX2233 at 112:22-
113:5 (Ryan Dep.). 
• 222  
I use the Fischel model the parties provided to calculate my DCF. I note that Fischel's 
model includes a broken reference (#REF!) in Ex. N on the "AOL Dilutive Results 
(lexicon)" tab at cell BJ4. The reference impacts calculations made in the "DCF" tab 
regarding the shares outstanding at cell B16. I input "85.1" into cell B16 in accordance 
with Fischel's Report at JX2255 P 57, which states that "AOL had approximately 85.1 
million fully diluted shares outstanding as of the Valuation Date." The result was a $1.28 
per share difference when applying a 3.5% perpetuity growth rate, or $46.13 per share. 
The parties may address any concerns with this approach before the Final Order. 
• 223  
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Neal v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 127, 1990 WL 109243, at *16 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990), aff'd, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991). 
• 224  
JX2255 at 36 (citing Aswath Damodaran, Dealing with Cash, Cross Holdings and Other 
Non- Operating Assets: Approaches and Implications, working paper, Sept. 2005, at 12) 
("Damodaran"). 
• 225  
JX2255 (Fischel Report) P 55 (including "cash and equivalents of $530 million plus 
assets held for sale of $24 million"). 
• 226  
Id. 
• 227  
JX2277 (Cornell Report) at 134. 
• 228  
Pet'rs Post-Trial Opening Br. 69. 
• 229  
See JX1546 at 12 (Guggenheim) (showing $477 million cash in an enterprise value 
analysis); JX2319 (Allen) at Tabs "WholeCo Multiple Val," "SOTP-Mult" (showing each 
as incorporating $493 million cash under a multiple-based valuation analysis), "WholeCo 
DCF (Old CF)," (including $493 million cash in calculating the weighted average cost of 
capital). I note that the Petitioners do not clearly point to an example of where Allen & 
Co. added back all of AOL's cash balance after a DCF analysis. 
• 230  
See, e.g., JX2267 (excerpt of AOL June 30, 2014 10-Q showing cash and equivalents of 
$136.2 million); JX2268 (excerpt of AOL March 31, 2014 10-Q showing cash and 
equivalents of $123.5 million); Trial Tr. (Dykstra) 764:1-2 ("I don't remember when we 
first came up with the [$150 million] minimum cash [goal]."). 
• 231  
Trial Tr. 765:4-7 (AOL CFO Karen Dykstra) ("I said we had a goal of maintaining $150 
million. We felt that that should be our minimum cash balance. We felt that that was 
51 
 
prudent."); JX00921 at 31 (Feb. 27, 2015 AOL Board Agenda: "To balance our growth 
strategy with cash management objectives, our goals are to maintain . . . at least $150m of 
cash on hand, using the credit facility for strategic transactions (share repurchases and 
M&A transactions)."). 
• 232  
See supra note 222. 
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